Abstract-We introduce a new family of rank metric codes: Low Rank Parity Check codes (LRPC), for which we propose an efficient probabilistic decoding algorithm. This family of codes can be seen as the equivalent of classical LDPC codes for the rank metric. We then use these codes to design cryptosystems Ã la McEliece: more precisely we propose two schemes for key encapsulation mechanism (KEM) and public key encryption (PKE). Unlike rank metric codes used in previous encryption algorithms -notably Gabidulin codes -LRPC codes have a very weak algebraic structure. Our cryptosystems can be seen as an equivalent of the NTRU cryptosystem (and also to the more recent MDPC code-based cryptosystem) in a rank metric context, due to the similar form of the public keys. The present paper is an extended version of the article introducing LRPC codes, with important new contributions. We have improved the decoder thanks to a new approach which allows for decoding of errors of higher rank weight, namely up to 2 3 (n − k) when the previous decoding algorithm only decodes up to n−k 2 errors. Our codes therefore outperform the classical Gabidulin code decoder which deals with weights up to n−k 2 . This comes at the expense of probabilistic decoding, but the decoding error probability can be made arbitrarily small. The new approach can also be used to decrease the decoding error probability of previous schemes, which is especially useful for cryptography. Finally, we introduce ideal rank codes, which generalize double-circulant rank codes and allow us to avoid known structural attacks based on folding. To conclude, we propose different parameter sizes for our schemes and we obtain a public key of 3337 bits for key exchange and 5893 bits for public key encryption, both for 128 bits of security.
I. INTRODUCTION

I
N RECENT years there has been a burst of activity in the field of post-quantum cryptography, whose appeal has become even more apparent since the recent attacks on the discrete logarithm problem in small characteristic [1] . These events stress that unexpected new attacks on classical cryptographic systems can appear at any time and that it is important not to have all one's eggs in the same basket.
Among potential candidates for alternative cryptography, lattice-based and code-based cryptography are strong candidates. Rank-based cryptography relies on the difficulty of decoding error-correcting codes embedded in a rank metric space (often over extension fields of fields of prime order), when code-based cryptography relies on difficult problems related to error-correcting codes embedded in Hamming metric spaces (often over small fields F q ) and when lattice-based cryptography is mainly based on the study of q-ary lattices, which can be seen as codes over rings of type Z/qZ (for large q), embedded in Euclidean metric spaces.
The particular appeal of the rank metric is that the practical difficulty of the decoding problems grows very quickly with the size of parameters. In particular, it is possible to reach a complexity of 2 80 for random instances with size only a few thousand bits, while for lattices or codes, at least a hundred thousand bits are needed. Of course with codes and lattices it is possible to decrease the size to a few thousand bits but with additional structure like quasi-cyclicity [2] , which comes at the cost of losing reductions to known difficult problems. The rank metric was introduced by Delsarte and Gabidulin [3] , along with Gabidulin codes which are a rank-metric equivalent of Reed-Solomon codes.
Since then, rank metric codes have been used for many applications: coding theory and space-time coding in particular and also for cryptography. Until now the main tool for rank based cryptography was based on masking Gabidulin codes [4] in different ways and using the McEliece (or Niederreiter) setting with these codes. Most cryptosystems based on this idea were broken by using structural attacks which exploit the particular structure of Gabidulin codes ( [5] - [9] ). A similar situation exists in the Hamming case for which all cryptosystems based on Reed-Solomon codes have been broken for a similar reason: Reed-Solomon codes are so structured that they are difficult to mask and there is always structural information leaking.
Since the introduction of code-based cryptography by McEliece in 1978, the different cryptosystems proposed in the Hamming distance setting were based on masking a special family of decodable codes, like Goppa, Reed-Muller of Reed-Solomon codes. The strong structure of these codes usually implies a large public key size. Now in 1996 and 1997, two lattice-based cryptosystems were proposed independently: the NTRU [10] and the GGH [11] cryptosystems which can be seen as McEliece-type cryptosystems but for the Euclidean distance. Lattice based cryptography can be seen as code-based cryptography with q-ary (large alphabet) codes and Euclidean distance rather than the Hamming distance. Both 0018-9448 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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the NTRU and GGH cryptosystems are based on the same idea: knowing a random basis of small weight vectors enables one to obtain an efficient decoding algorithm suitable for cryptography. Moreover, the NTRU cryptosysem (which can be seen as an optimized case of the GGH cryptosystem [12] ) introduced for the first time the idea of using double-circulant matrices in order to decrease the size of the public key. This idea was made possible because of the randomness of the small dual basis. Finally, we remark that for 15 years the NTRU cryptosystem has not been really attacked on its double-circulant structure, indeed the best-known attacks rely on general LLL (named after their inventors Lenstra-LenstraLovász) decoding algorithms for lattices. In a classical cryptographic Hamming context, the second author [13] introduced in 2005 the idea of using quasi-cyclic codes to decrease the size of the public key. However, adding quasi-cyclicity to an already structured family of codes introduces too much structure and the system was broken [14] . This idea was then used with other families of quasi-cyclic (or quasi-dyadic) structured codes like Goppa quasi-dyadic [15] or quasi-cyclic alternant codes [2] : these systems lead to much smaller keys, but eventually they were attacked in [16] and even though the idea remains valid, the cryptanalysis of [16] showed that the idea of quasi-cyclic or quasi-dyadic structured codes could not lead to secure public keys of a few thousand bits, but rather to secure keys of a few tens of thousand bits.
More recently new proposals were made in the spirit of the original NTRU schemes with Hamming distance, first relying on quasi-cyclic LDPC codes [17] - [19] , then with MDPC codes in [20] . The latter family of codes enables one to obtain the same type of feature as the NTRU cryptosystem: a compact key and a security based on decoding with a random dual matrix with small weights.
A. Contributions of the Paper
The present paper introduces Low Rank Parity Check codes and is an extended version of [21] originally presented at WCC 2013, with important new contributions. We propose an improved decoder based on a new approach which allows for decoding of errors of higher rank weight, namely up to 2 3 (n−k) when the previous decoding algorithm only performed at rank weight n−k 2 . Our codes outperform the classical Gabidulin code decoder which deals with weights up to n−k 2 . This comes at the expense of probabilistic decoding, but the decoding error probability can be made arbitrarily small. For most of our proposed decoding algorithms we give a precise analysis of the decoding failure probability: for some situations the algorithm is iterative, in which case we only give an upper bound on the decoding error probability together with simulations which show that these bounds are attained in practice. The new approach can also be used to decrease the decoding error probability, which is especially useful for cryptography. Finally, we introduce double-circulant ideal rank codes, which generalize double-circulant rank codes. We propose different parameter sizes, of the order of 1 kilobit for the key size and cipher text.
B. Organization of the Paper
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 recalls basic facts about the rank metric and the corresponding difficult problems, Section 3 proves technical results that are used for decoding, Section 4 recalls the definition of LRPC codes and their basic decoding, Section 5 introduces a new general approach for improved decoding of LRPC codes, finally Section 6 is concerned with cryptography, we give our key exchange and public key exchange schemes, with a security reduction to general problems and parameters.
II. BACKGROUND ON RANK METRIC CODES
A. General Definitions
Notation: Let F q denote the finite field of q elements where q is the power of a prime and let F q m denote the field of q m elements seen as the extension of degree m of F q .
F q m is also an F q vector space of dimension m, we denote by capital letters the F q -subspaces of F q m and by lower-case letters the elements of F q m .
Let X ⊂ F q m . We denote by X the F q -subspace generated by the elements of X:
If X = {x 1 , . . . , x n }, we simply use the notation x 1 , . . . , x n .
Vectors are denoted by bold lower-case letters and matrices by bold capital letters (eg
If S is a finite set, we denote by x $ ← S the fact that x is chosen uniformly at random amongst S. 
• by a parity-check matrix H ∈ F 
We say that G (respectively H) is under systematic form if and only if it is of the form (I
The support E of x, denoted Supp(x), is the F q -subspace of F q m generated by the coordinates of x:
The number of supports of dimension w of F q m is given by the Gaussian coefficient
B. Double Circulant and Ideal Codes
To describe an [n, k] q m linear code, we can give a systematic generator matrix or a systematic parity-check matrix. In both cases, the number of bits needed to represent such a matrix is k(n − k)m log 2 q . To reduce the size of a representation of a code, we introduce double circulant codes.
First we need to define circulant matrices.
Definition II.4 (Circulant matrix). A square matrix M of size n × n is said to be circulant if it is of the form
We denote M n (F q m ) the set of circulant matrices of size n × n over F q m . a) Relation between cyclic matrix form and polynomial form: The following proposition states an important property of circulant matrices.
, that-is-to-say the set of polynomials with coefficients in F q m modulo X n −1. The canonical isomorphism is given by
In the following, in order to simplify notation, we will identify the polynomial
with the vector g = (g 0 , . . . , g n−1 ) ∈ F n q m . We will denote ug mod P the vector of the coefficients of the polynomial With the previous notation, we have C = {(xa, xb), x ∈ F n q m }. Since a is invertible in F q m [X]/(X n − 1), then C = {(x, x g), x ∈ F n q m } where g = a −1 b. In this case we say that C is generated by g ( mod X n − 1). Thus we only need nm log 2 q bits to describe a [2n, n] q m double circulant code.
We can generalize double circulant codes by choosing another polynomial P to define the quotient-ring F q m [X]/(P). This family of codes was defined in [22] . 
. . .
More concisely, we have C = {(x g 1 mod P, x g 2 mod P), x ∈ F n q m }. We will often omit mentioning the polynomial P if there is no ambiguity.
We usually require g 1 to be invertible, in which case the code admits the systematic form, C = {(x, x g), x ∈ F n q m } with g = g −1 1 g 2 mod P. We need to be careful when we use these notations in the case of parity-check matrices. Indeed, if we have a syndrome σ = e 1 h 1 + e 2 h 2 mod P, this equality is equivalent in terms of product matrix-vectors to (H 1 |H 2 )(e 1 |e 2 ) T = σ T where
Thus, we say that (h 1 , h 2 ) and P define a parity-check matrix of a code
is a parity-check matrix of C.
C. Difficult Problems in Rank Metric
In this section, we introduce some difficult problems on which our cryptosystems are based.
Problem II.8 (Rank Syndrome Decoding). Given a full-rank matrix
, a syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to find a vector x ∈ F n q m of weight lower than w such that H x T = σ T .
In [23] it is proven that the Syndrome Decoding problem in the Hamming metric, which is a well-known NP-Hard problem, is probabilistically reduced to the RSD problem. Moreover, the RSD problem can be seen as a structured version of the NP-Hard MinRank problem, indeed the MinRank problem is equivalent to the RSD problem for F q -linear codes.
This problem has an equivalent dual version. Let H be a parity-check matrix of a code C and G be a generator matrix. The RSD problem is equivalent to finding m ∈ F k q m and x ∈ F n q m such that mG + x = y with y of weight r and y a pre-image of s by H. We can now introduce the decisional version of this problem. Problem II.10 (Ideal-Rank Syndrome Decoding). Given a vector h ∈ F n q m , a polynomial P ∈ F q [X] of degree n, a syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to sample a vector
q m of weight lower than w such that
Since h and P define a systematic parity-check matrix of a [2n, n] q m ideal code, the I − RSD problem is a particular case of the RSD problem. Although this problem is theoretically easier than RSD problem, in practice the best algorithms for solving both these problems are the same.
Problem II.11 (Ideal-Rank Support Recovery). Given a vector
of degree n, a syndrome σ and a weight w, it is hard to recover the support E of dimension lower than w such that e 1 + e 2 h = σ mod P where the vectors e 1 and e 2 were sampled from E. b) Equivalence between the I − RSD and I − RSR problems: The I − RSR problem is trivially reduced to the I − RSD problem. Indeed to recover the support E of an instance of the I − RSD problem from a solution x of the I − RSD problem, we just have to compute the support of x.
Conversely, the I − RSD problem can also be reduced to the I − RSR problem. Let us suppose we know the support E of a solution of the I − RSR problem for a weight w. We want to find x = (x 1 , x 2 ) of weight lower than w such that
This equation is equivalent to ⎛
where
. . , E w ) be a basis of E. We can express the coordinates of x 1 and x 2 in this basis:
Then we rewrite the equations (1) in the new unknowns λ i j k . We obtain a system of 2nw unknowns over F q and n equations over F q m , so nm equations over F q .
Since e 1 + e 2 h = σ mod P, the system has at least one solution and by construction all the solutions have their support included in E of dimension w, so we can find a solution to the I − RSD problem by solving this system. III. SOME RESULTS ON THE PRODUCT OF TWO SUBSPACES Before introducing the decoding algorithm of LRPC codes, we need to introduce some results on the product of two subspaces.
Definition III.1. Let A and B be two F q -subspaces of F q m : we call the product space of A and B, and denote it by AB, the F q -linear span of the set of products {ab, a ∈ A, b ∈ B}.
If A and B have dimensions α and β, and are generated respectively by {a 1 , · · · , a α } and {b 1 , · · · , b β }, then the product space AB is obviously generated by the set {a i b j , 1 i α, 1 j β} and its dimension is therefore bounded above by αβ.
A question of interest that concerns us is the probability that the dimension is not maximal when α and β are relatively small. Let A and B be random F q -subspaces of F q m of dimensions α and β respectively. We suppose αβ < m and we investigate the typical dimension of the subspace AB.
We rely on the following lemma: In practice, our tests shows that the probability that dim AB = rd is slightly larger than the probability that rd elements of F q m chosen uniformly at random generate a subspace of dimension rd. This difference becomes rapidly negligible, even for small value such as α = 3, β = 4, m = 20.
Let B be a fixed subspace of F q m containing 1 and let B 2 be the subspace generated by all products of two, possibly equal, elements of B. with λ i ∈ F q for all i and b j / ∈ F q and λ j = 0 for some j , otherwise e ∈ A contrary to our assumption. Let b be any element of B. By our hypothesis we have eb ∈ AB, meaning there exist μ j ∈ F q such that c) A better bound: Our goal is to show that with a large probability, when A and B are randomly chosen with sufficiently small dimension, then with probability close to 1 we have that:
Without loss of generality we can suppose that 1 ∈ B. We shall show that for a random b ∈ B, we have that b = 0 and Proof: This event can only happen if b is a root of an equation of the form
There are at most |B 1 | 2 = q 2β 1 such equations, and each one of them has at most two roots. Let B 1 be any vector space containing 1 and of dimension β 1 . Let b be a random element uniformly distributed in F q m and set
By the union bound, the union of these events, over all b 1 ∈ B 1 \ {0}, has probability at most (
We have therefore that either b = 0 or B 1 ∩ b −1 B 1 = {0} with probability at most
Therefore with probability at least
we have that b = 0 and
Now applying Lemma III.6 we obtain:
Lemma III.7. With probability at least
we have that
Let A be a randomly chosen subspace of dimension α. With probability at least 1 − α
we have that AB ∩ b −1 AB = A Proof: By Proposition III.3 we have that with probability at least
On the other hand, we have that i S behaves as a random subspace which contains A, the probability that one intersection b 
IV. LRPC CODES AND THEIR BASIC DECODING
A. Low Rank Parity Check Codes
LRPC codes were introduced in [21] . They are good candidates for the McEliece cryptosystem of because the have a weak algebraic structure.
Definition IV.1 (LRPC codes). Let
be a full-rank matrix such that its coefficients generate an F q -subspace F of small dimension d:
Let C be the code with parity-check matrix H. By definition, C is an [n, k] q m LRPC code of dual weight d. Such a matrix H is called a homogeneous matrix of weight d and support F.
We can now define ideal LRPC codes similarly to our definition of ideal codes.
Definition IV.2 (Ideal LRPC codes). Let F be an
When the matrix H = (H 1 |H 2 ) has rank n over F q m , the code C with parity check matrix H is called an ideal LRPC code of type [2n, n] q m .
As we can see, since P ∈ F q [X], the support of X i h 1 is still F for all 1 i n − 1 hence the necessity to choose P with coefficients in the base field F q to keep the LRPC structure of the ideal code.
B. A Basic Decoding Algorithm
The general idea of the algorithm is to use the fact that we know a parity-check matrix with a small weight d that is to say that the F q -subspace F of F q m spanned by the coordinates of this matrix has a small dimension of d, hence the subspace S = s 1 , . . . , s n k generated by the coordinates of syndrome enables one to recover the whole product space P = E F of the support of the error and of the known small basis of H . Knowing the space P and the space F enables one to recover E. Then, knowing the support E of the error e, it is easy to recover the exact value of each coordinate by solving a linear system. This approach is very similar to the classical decoding procedure of BCH codes for instance, where one recovers the error-locator polynomial, which gives the support of the error, and then the value of the error coordinates.
Consider an [n, k] q m LRPC code C of low weight d, with generator matrix G and dual (n−k)×n matrix H, such that all the coordinates h i j of H belong to a space F of dimension d
Suppose the received word to be y = xG + e where e ∈ F n q m is the error vector of rank r . Let E = Supp(e) and let {e 1 , . . . , e r } be a basis of E.
We have the basic decoding algorithm described in Figure 1 , which has a probability of failure that we will consider in subsection IV-D.
C. Correctness of the Algorithm
We prove the correctness of the algorithm in the ideal case when dim E F = rd, dim S = rd and dim S 1 ∩S 2 ∩· · ·∩S d = r . We will see in the next subsection that this is the general case.
Step 1: the first step of the algorithm is obvious.
Step 2: now we want to prove that
Since by hypothesis the space S is exactly the product space E F, we have f i e j ∈ S, ∀1 ≤ j ≤ r , hence e j ∈ S i for all i, j . Therefore
Step 3: once the support E of the error e is known, one can write e i = 1≤ j ≤r e i j e j , with e i j ∈ F q and solve the linear system H e T = s T in the nr unknowns e i j . The system has nr unknowns in F q and (n − k)rd equations in F q coming from the n − k syndrome equations in E F. The parameter d is chosen such that d ≥ n n−k .
D. Probability of Failure
We now consider the different possibilities of failure, there are three cases to consider. The case dim E F = rd corresponds to proposition III.3, the case E = S 1 ∩ S 2 ∩ · · · ∩ S d corresponds to proposition III.5. In both cases the probability can be made exponentially small depending on the parameters, especially when in practice the upper bound given are really large compared to experimental results.
The last case is the case dim S = rd. We have the following easy proposition: 
Proposition IV.3. The probability that the n − k syndrome coordinates do not generate the product space E F is less than q rd−(n−k) .
Proof: By construction all s i belong to the product space E F and since the error is taken randomly and the matrix H is full-rank, the s i can be seen as random elements of E F. Now if one considers a set of (n − k) random elements in a space of dimension rd (with n − k ≥ rd) the probability that this set does not generate the whole space is equal to the probability that a random [rd, n − k] matrix over F q is not full-rank, which is not more than q (n−k)−rd according to the lemma below.
Lemma IV.4. Let a, x be integers and let A be a uniform random a × (a + x) matrix over F q . The probability that A has rank less than a is bounded from above by q −x .
Proof: Proceed by induction on a. When a = 1, the probability that A is not full-rank is the probability that its unique random row equals the zero row, which is equal to q −(x+1) < q −x . Let now a > 1 and suppose the result proved for matrices with a − 1 rows. The probability of A not being full-rank is, by the law of total probability, not more than
where P 1 is the probability that A is not full-rank, conditional on its first a − 1 rows being full-rank, and where P 2 is the probability that the first a − 1 rows of A are not full-rank. we have P 1 ≤ q a−1 /q a+x = 1/q x+1 and P 2 ≤ q −x−1 by the induction hypothesis. Hence the probability of A not being full-rank is at most 2q −x−1 ≤ q −x .
The previous discussion shows that depending on the parameters the probability of failure of the previous algorithm can be made arbitrarily small and that the main probability we have to consider in fact is the probability given by Proposition IV.3, which is not an upper bound but what happens in practice.
E. Computational Cost of Decoding
The most costly step of the algorithm are step 2) and step 3). The cost of step 2) is the cost of the intersection of vector spaces which has cost 4 r 2 d 2 m operations in the base field (this operation can also be done in a very elegant way with q-polynomials [24] ). Now the cost of step 3) is the cost of solving the system H e T = s T when the support E of the error is known. If one proceeds naively there are nr unknowns (the e i j ) and the cost of matrix inversion is n 3 r 3 , but one can use a precomputation to perform this step in n 2 r operations.
To solve the linear system in n 2 r operations, we introduce the matrix A r H , which corresponds to the matrix H "unfolded" over F q and represents the system He T = s T .
We want to solve the following system:
. .
Suppose dim E F is exactly rd. Then we can unfold each s i in the basis ( f i e j ) 1 Each of these relations can be viewed as a linear system with nr unknowns (the e i j ) and rd equations from the syndrome in F q (see figure V-A) .
Where Since A H is a nr × nr matrix, it can be chosen such that it only contains r × r diagonal matrices. A H and D H can therefore be stored in memory as n 2 elements of F q , and can be inverted in n 3 operations in F q instead of n 3 r 3 operations. Using this representation, we can see that the multiplication D H .s takes only n 2 r multiplications in F q since each row of the condensed matrix contributes to r error coordinates, hence the complexity. This complexity can also be attained with the full nr × nr matrix by taking into account the fact that it is composed of multiple r × r diagonal matrices.
V. IMPROVED DECODING: SYNDROME SPACE EXPANSION ALGORITHM
In general, the basic decoding algorithm presented in Section IV does not work when the syndrome space S = s 1 , ..., s n−k is different from E F. In this section, we present an algorithm that can be used between steps 1) and 2) of the basic decoding algorithm to recover E F in certain cases when dim S < dim E F. We denote by c the codimension of S in E F, that is to say c = dim E F − dim S.
In this section, we will always suppose that dim E F = rd for two reasons:
• first, according to Proposition III.3, the probability p 1 that dim E F < rd can easily be exponentially low by increasing m. We can also decrease the probability p 2 that S = E F by increasing n, however for cryptographic applications of LRPC, the parameters of the code are such that p 1 is negligible with respect to p 2 .
• secondly, the case dim E F = rd is the worst case for the decoding since the probability that S = E F increases when the dimension of E F decreases. Thus, we can analyze the theoretical probability of failure in the worst case scenario. All the tests we have made show that in practice the probability of failure is smaller when dim S < rd, which confirms our analysis.
A. General Idea
This algorithm's aim is to recover vectors of the product space E F which do not belong to the syndrome space S by using the structure of the product space E F = f 1 e 1 , f 2 e 1 , ..., f d e r and the fact that we know a basis
We use a function which take on input the subspace S and outputs a subspace S such that S S ⊂ E F with a very high probability, depending on the parameters of the code. We call such a function an "expansion function".
Here are two examples of expansion functions:
is used to decode errors of larger weight. 2) f prob (S) = S + F S i j , where S i j = S i ∩ S j , is used to reduce the decoding failure rate. We use these expansion functions to describe an iterative algorithm [2] . Detailed algorithms for each function are given in the next subsections.
since f i E and S are subspaces of E F. Hence:
As we will see in the next subsections, each expansion function has advantages and drawbacks, and the choice of which function to use depends on the parameters. In particular, m needs to be high enough for these functions to work. The function f decode needs m ≥ 3rd − 2 and allows to decode errors of weight up to 2 3 (n − k) whereas the function f prob only needs m ≥ 2rd −r . In this case we can only decode errors of weight up to
but by strongly reducing the decoding failure probability. In particular, this latter case corresponds to parameters used for cryptography, where rd
and m ≈ n.
B. Increasing the Weight of the Decoded Error Vectors
In this subsection we explain in details the function f decode (the algorithm is described figure 3) .
The idea is that each subspace of the form (S + f i S j ) has a chance to contain vectors x such that x ∈ E F and x / ∈ S, since E F ∩ f i S j = {0}. If we find some new vectors of E F but not the whole product space, we can reuse values of (i, j, k, l) already tested because they may lead us to recover some new vectors thanks to the one we have added. Hence the algorithm functions in an iterative way. If during a whole iteration, the dimension of S does not increase, then the algorithm will fail.
d) Maximum weight of the decoded errors: Without using the syndrome space expansion algorithm, the decoding algorithm for LRPC codes can decode up to r = (n − k) with probability ≈ 0.29 for the case q = 2.
Since
The formula for computing this probability can be found in [25] (Proposition 3.2) . We obtain:
By applying the series expansion for P a,b (n) (Appendix, page 7715) with n = 3r, obtain:
In the case q = 2 and 3r = 2(n − k), this approximation is incorrect. According to Equation (5),
(the convergence is very fast).
In figure 4 , we present simulation results comparing the observed probability of failure and q −1 . Proof: For d > 2, the algorithm may recover E F as long as c < r (i.e there are vectors of E in S i ) using the iterative effect, so the algorithm does not have to recover the whole product space at a time : if it recovers one new vector then it can be added to S and used with different values of (i, j, k, l) (even those that have already been used) to produce more vectors, hence the only condition for that method to work is c < r in order to have vectors of E in S i .
If the n − k syndrome vectors are independent, then c is rd − (n − k), which gives the result:
Although giving a theorical probability of failure is difficult in this case since there is an iterative effect, simulations show that in practice we attain this bound. The intersection between S i j and S kl needs to remove all the random vectors in order to recover vectors that are ∈ E F, whence:
Since c can not be higher than r − 1 (there would be no vectors of E in f −1 j S), the inequality becomes m 3rd − 2.
The value of m needed by this expansion function is pretty high and does not fit the parameters used for cryptography. However, it works for d = 2, which is not the case of f prob studied in the next subsection.
C. Reducing the Decryption Failure Rate
1) Description of the Algorithm:
In this subsection we will study f prob in a more detailed way (the algorithm is described figure 5.
This function fits the parameters used for cryptography and is used to reduce the decoding failure rate. It uses the fact that S i j = S i ∩ S j contains at least r − 2c independent vectors of E (see Proposition V.5) and is a subspace of E with a very high probability when m is large enough. Thus, the subspace F S i j has a chance to contain a vector x ∈ E F and x / ∈ S.
Proof: Using Proposition V.1, a simple computation gives us the result: Theorem V.6. Let Prob(c = l) be the probability that dim E F − dim S = l and let Prob c=l ( f ailure) be the probability that the syndrome space expansion algorithm does not recover E F when c = l. Using the syndrome space expansion algorithm with f prob , the probability of failure is :
Proof: The main source of decoding failures for the basic decoding algorithm is the fact that the syndrome coordinates do not generate the whole product space E F, so we need to compute the global probability of not recovering E F using f prob .
When c r 2 , in general S i j is empty so the syndrome space expansion algorithm will not recover E F, which leads to a failure.
When c < r 2 , the probability that the syndrome space expansion algorithm recovers E F is Prob c=l ( f ailure). We multiply this probability by the probability of c being equal to l to get the overall probability of not recovering E F.
Proposition V.7. Prob(c = l) q −l(n−k−rd+l)
Proof: The probability that the n−k syndrome coordinates generate a subspace of codimension l of E F is the probability that a random (n − k) × rd matrix in F q is of rank rd − l. From [26] , we have that S t , the number of m × n matrix of rank t, is :
We can approximate this formula by ignoring q j , which leads to :
From that, we deduce the number of (n − k) × rd matrices of rank rd − l:
By dividing this quantity by the total number of (n −k)×rd matrices, we get the probability that a random matrix has rank rd − l:
Hence the result.
2) Case of Codimension 1:
Before giving the probability of success of Algorithm 5, we need the following lemma:
Lemma V.8. The dimension of S i ∩ E is:
• r with probability p r = rd − 1 r q rd r q ≈ q −r .
• r − 1 with probability 1 − p r ≈ 1 − q −r .
Proof:
The space f i E is a subspace of dimension r of E F and S is a random subspace of dimension rd − 1 of E F, hence
which proves the first point. According to Proposition V.1, dim(S i ∩ E) r − 1 which concludes the proof of this lemma.
We can now give the probability of success of the decoding algorithm in the case dim S = dim E F − 1.
Theorem V.9. Under the assumption S i j ⊂ E and dim S = dim E F − 1, the syndrome space expansion algorithm using f prob recovers E F with probability at least 1 − q (2−r)(d−2) .
Proof: To find an upper bound on the probability of failure, we are going to focus on the case where dim(S i j ∩E) = r − 2. Indeed, Lemma V.8 shows that the typical dimension of S i ∩ E is r − 1. Furthermore, when there exists i such that dim(S i ∩E) = r , the algorithm has access to more vectors of E and so this leads to a smaller probability of failure. The same thing goes for the case where there exists dim(S i j ) = r − 1 instead of r −2 which is the expected size, so we can consider that dim(S i j ) = r − 2 since this will lead to an upper bound of the probability of failure.
We are now going to study the dimension of S i j + S j k + S ik . There are two possibilities:
• If S i j = S j k , then necessarily we have S ik = S i j = S j k , because the r − 2 vectors of S i j + S j k are both in S i and S k . This happens with probability q 2−r : the probability that two subspaces of dimension r − 2 (S i j and S j k ) of a vector space of dimension r − 1 (S j ∩ E) are equal.
• If S i j = S j k , then we have S ik + S i j + S j k = E: we know that S ik + S i j = S i ∩ E, and that S j k ⊂ S i (otherwise we would be in the first case). Hence S ik + S i j + S j k = E. If there exists a set {S i 1 j 1 , . . . , S i n j n } such that their direct sum equals E, then the algorithm will succeed since it will have added exactly E F to S at one point. If such a set does not exist, then it means that every S i j are equal to each other. In particular, every vector of E the algorithm as access to is ∈ S 1 , . . . , ∈ S d , which means that when we multiply this vector by F, the resulting vectors will already be in S and we will obtain no information, causing the algorithm to fail.
The probability that all the S i j are equal is the probability of S 12 = S 23 = · · · = S d−1,d . Since d − 2 equalities are needed, the probability of this happening is q (2−r) (d−2) , which gives the probability of failure.
a) Impact of m on decoding: If the value of m is not high enough, then S i j will contain not only vectors of E but also random vectors. When this happens, the S i j cannot be used by the expansion algorithm because it would add random vectors to S. Proposition V. 10 . Let E be a subspace of F q m of dimension r. Let F 1 and F 2 be two subspaces of F q m such that
The proof of this proposition is given appendix.
Corollary V.11. Applying Proposition V.10 with F
From corollary V.11, we can see that adding 1 to the value of m leads to a factor q −1 in the probability of finding random vectors in S i j , thus this probability can be made arbitrarily small.
To detect that S i j contains random vectors, we can keep track of the dimension of S during the expansion. Indeed, if S i j contains random vectors, adding F S i j to S will lead to a dimension greater than rd. In this case we just need to discard the vectors we just added and continue with the next S i j .
b) Comments on the small values of q: When using small values of q, the cases where dim S i ∩ E or dim S i j > r − 2 are not so rare. Simulation for d = 3, r = 3 seems to show that the probability q (2−r) (d−2) is accurate when q is high enough, but is a pessimistic bound when q is small, especially when q = 2. Simulation results are shown in figure 6 . Proposition V.12. For q = 2, the syndrome space expansion algorithm using f prob recovers E F with probability at least 1 − q (1−r)(d−2) . Proof: When q = 2, the probability that S i j = S j k used in the proof above is not q 2−r but q 1−r . Indeed, from Proposition V.10, we get that the probability of S i j and S j k being equal is approximately
This leads to a failure probability of q (1−r) (d−2) . This is still not as good as what happens in practice, since it does not take into account the fact that the algorithm often has more than r − 2 vectors of E in each S i j to work with, but is a closer estimate in this special case.
3) Case of Codimension 2:
In the case c 2, we have no theoretical analysis, but we can do simulations for particular parameters to estimate the probability of failure. In practice we obtain good estimations of the probability of failure. For example, for q = 2, c = 2, r = 5, d = 6 and m = 80, we obtain a probability of failure of 2 −14 .
4) Upper Bound on the Decryption Failure Rate:
• The codimension of S in E F is 1, but the algorithm fails to recover E F.
• The codimension of S in E F is greater than 1. Since it is difficult to give a theorical bound on the probability, we will consider that decoding fails in that case:
D. Tradeoff Between Expansion Functions
In the previous subsections we studied two expansion functions in detail:
• f decode can decode higher values of r but needs a higher m (m ≥ 3rd − r ) • f prob fits values of m (m ≥ 2rd−r ) used in cryptography, but is less effective since it decodes up to c < r 2 instead of c < r Depending on the parameters, we can build new expansion functions: in general, the higher m is, the better the expansion function will be. For example, if m is really high, we can use this function:
is basically an improvement of f decode since it has a higher chance of recovering vectors of E F by adding two f i S j at a time. 
E. Rank Support Recovery Algorithm
Algorithm 1 computes the error vector from the syndrome equations He T = s T . However, for cryptographic applications, we may just recover the support of the error and use it as the shared secret since the I − RS R and I − RS D problems are equivalent. We use the Rank Support Recovery (RSR) algorithm 7 which is a shortened version of the decoding algorithm 1 which does not compute the coordinates of the error, and uses f prob to reduce the decoding failure rate.
Algorithm 5 allows to reduce the decryption failure rate by a factor q (2−r) (d−2) . However, this algorithm takes a variable number of iterations to terminate, which may lead to big variations in the global execution time. In particular, if one can determine whether the syndrome space expansion algorithm was needed or not, the execution time may leak some information. To prevent that, we present a variation of the syndrome space recovery algorithm [8] that performs a fixed number of intersections and still fits the proof of Theorem V.9.
F. Complexity of the Decoding Algorithm
Algorithms 3 and 5 are iterative algorithms, hence their exact complexity is hard to study precisely. We can however give an upper bound of their complexity, by noticing that the maximum number of iterations before the algorithms finishes is at most c: indeed, c must decrease at each iteration, otherwise the algorithms will stop returning f ailure. Proposition V.13. The number of operations in F q for the syndrome space expansion algorithm using f decode in algorithm 3 is bounded above by:
Proof: As said before, the complexity of this algorithm can be bounded by c times the cost of an iteration. When using f decode , the most costly operation is the computation of the intersection. Intersecting two vector spaces of dimension 2rd Proposition V.14. The number of operations in F q for the syndrome space expansion algorithm using f prob in algorithm 5 is bounded above by:
Proof: The proof is the same as for proposition V.13, except that the most costly step of each iteration is the computation of the S i j . Intersecting two vector spaces of dimension rd costs 4 r 2 d 2 m operations in F q , and there are d(d − 1) S i j to compute at each iteration, hence the result.
In order to allow constant time implementations, the syndrome space expansion algorithm used in the cryptographic context computes a fixed number of intersections, so its complexity can be derived easily:
Proposition V.15. The number of operations in F q for the syndrome space expansion algorithm used in the cryptographic context in algorithm 8 is:
Proof: As for Proposition V.14, the most costly step of this algorithm is the computation of every S i j . Each intersection costs 4 r 2 d 2 m, and the structure of the algorithm allows to reduce the number of intersections to
In practice the algorithm for cryptographic applications is very efficient, and for the iterative case, the upper bound is scarcely met since the algorithm usually stops before doing the maximum number of possible iterations.
VI. APPLICATIONS TO CRYPTOGRAPHY
LRPC codes are good candidates for use in the McEliece cryptosystem [27] . As a reminder, the McEliece cryptosystem is a public key encryption scheme based on coding theory. Basically, the secret key is the description of a code C that we can efficiently decode and the public key is a scrambled description of this code. To encrypt a message M, one computes a codeword c M ∈ C and one adds to it an error e. The ciphertext is C = c M + e. If we know the "good" description, we can decode C and recover the message whereas an attacker has to either apply generic decoding algorithms for arbitrary codes, which amounts to trying to solve an NP-hard problem, or recover the hidden structure of C.
Ideal LRPC codes are easy to hide since we only need to reveal their systematic parity-check matrix. Due to their weak algebraic structure, it is hard to recover the structure of an LRPC code from its systematic form. We can now introduce a new problem on which the security of our cryptosystem is based:
Problem VI.1 (Ideal LRPC codes indistinguishability). Given a polynomial P ∈ F q [X] of degree n and a vector h ∈ F n q m , it is hard to distinguish whether the ideal code C with the parity-check matrix generated by h and P is a random ideal code or whether it is an ideal LRPC code of weight d.
In other words, it is hard to distinguish whether h was sampled uniformly at random or as x −1 y mod P where the vectors x and y have the same support of small dimension d.
In [28] , a structural attack against DC-LRPC codes is made by using the divisors of X n − 1 in F q [X] . That is why the ideal LRPC codes are particularly interesting if we choose an irreducible polynomial for P. In this case we utterly counter this structural attack.
In the current state of the art, there is no structural attack against generic LRPC codes: the attack [29] on RankSign only works on very specific parameters: it is needed that the weight d of the secret parity-check matrix is less or equal to n n−k , which is not the case for the parameters described in VI-E.
Thus, the most efficient known attack against this problem consists of searching for a codeword of weight d in the dual C ⊥ of the LRPC code. Indeed, h = x −1 y mod P ⇐⇒ y + xh = 0 mod P so (x| y) ∈ C ⊥ . The small weight codeword research algorithms are the same as for the algorithm solving the RSD problem, so we consider the algorithm of [30] . However this algorithm is more efficient for LRPC codes than for random codes. Indeed, since an LRPC code admits a parity-check matrix H of small weight d, any F q -linear combinations of the rows of H is a codeword of weight at most d of C ⊥ . In the case of Ideal-LRPC codes, the complexity of the algorithm is divided by q n . Thus the complexity of the attack is O n 3 m 3 q d m 2 −m−n . We can also consider the algebraic attacks using the Groebner bases [31] . The advantage of these attacks is that they are independent of the size of q. They mainly depend on the number of unknowns with respect to the number of equations. However, in the case q = 2 the number of unknowns is generally too high for the algorithms by Groebner basis to be more efficient than combinatorial attacks described in VI-D. We have chosen our parameters in such a way so that the best attacks are combinatorial: the expected complexity of the algorithms by Groebner basis is based on the article [32] .
A. An IND-CPA KEM Based on the Rank Metric
Definition of a KEM: A Key-Encapsulation scheme KEM = (KeyGen, Encap, Decap) is a triple of probabilistic algorithms together with a key space K. The key generation algorithm KeyGen generates a pair of public and secret keys (pk, sk). The encapsulation algorithm Encap uses the public key pk to produce an encapsulation c, and a key K ∈ K. Finally Decap using the secret key sk and an encapsulation c, recovers the key K ∈ K or fails and return ⊥.
We define IND-CPA-security of KEM formally via the following experiment, where Encap 0 returns a valid key pair c * , K * , while Encap 1 return a valid c * and a random K * .
Indistinguishability under Chosen Plaintext Attack:
This notion states that an adversary should not be able to efficiently guess which key is encapsulated.
Definition VI.2 (IND-CPA Security). A key encapsulation scheme KEM is IND-CPA-secure if for every PPT (probabilistic polynomial time) adversary A, we have that
Description of the Scheme: Our scheme contains a hash function G modeled as a Random Oracle Model (ROM).
• KeyGen(1 λ ): -choose an irreducible polynomial P ∈ F q [X] of degree n. -choose uniformly at random a subspace F of F q m of dimension d and sample a couple of vectors (x, y)
-define pk = (h, P) and sk = (x, y).
• Encap(pk):
-choose uniformly at random a subspace E of F q m of dimension r and sample a couple of vectors (e 1 , e 2 ) $ ← E n × E n such that Supp(e 1 ) = Supp(e 2 ) = E. -compute c = e 1 + e 2 h mod P. -define K = G(E) and return c.
• Decap(sk):
-compute xc = xe 1 + ye 2 mod P and recover E with the RSR algorithm 7.
We need to have a common representation of a subspace of dimension r of F q m . The natural way is to choose the unique matrix M ∈ F r×m q of size r × m in its row echelon form such that the rows of M are a basis of E.
We deal with the semantic security of the KEM in Section VI-C.
B. An IND-CCA-2 PKE Based on the Rank Metric
Our KEM can be slightly modified to become a PKE cryptosystem. A Public Key Encryption (PKE) scheme is defined by three algorithms: the key generation algorithm KeyGen which takes on input the security parameter λ and outputs a pair of public and private keys ( pk, sk); the encryption algorithm Enc( pk, M) which outputs the ciphertext C corresponding to the message M and the decryption algorithm Dec(sk, C) which outputs the plaintext M.
Our PKE scheme contains a hash function G modeled as a ROM.
• KeyGen(1 λ ):
-choose an irreducible polynomial P ∈ F q [X] of degree n. -choose uniformly at random a subspace F of F q m of dimension d and sample a couple of vectors (x, y)
• Enc( pk, M):
-choose uniformly at random a subspace E of F q m of dimension r and sample a couple of vectors (e 1 , e 2 ) $ ← E n × E n such that Supp(e 1 ) = Supp(e 2 ) = E. -compute c = e 1 + e 2 h mod P.
• Dec(sk, C):
-compute xc = xe 1 + ye 2 mod P and recover E with the ideal RSR algorithm 7. Proof: We are going to proceed in a sequence of games. The simulator first starts from the real scheme. First we replace the public key matrix by a random element, and then we use the ROM to solve the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery.
C. Security of our Schemes
We start from the normal game G 0 : We generate the public key h honestly, and E, c also
• In game G 1 , we now replace h by a random vector, the rest is identical to the previous game. From an adversary point of view, the only difference is the distribution of h, which is either generated at random, or as a product of low weight vectors. This is exactly the Ideal LRPC indistinguishability problem, hence
• In game G 2 , we now proceed as earlier except we receive h, c from a Support Recovery challenger. After sending c to the adversary, we monitor the adversary queries to the Random Oracle, and pick a random one that we forward as our simulator answer to the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery problem. Either the adversary was able to predict the random oracle output, or with probably 1/q G , we picked the query associated with the support E (by q G we denote the number of queries to the random oracle G), hence
which leads to the conclusion. Proof: We are going to proceed in a sequence of games. The simulator first starts from the real scheme. First we replace the public key matrix by a random element, and then we use the ROM to solve the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery.
• In game G 2 , we now proceed as earlier except we replace G(E) by random. It can be shown, that by monitoring the call to the ROM, the difference between this game and the previous one can be reduced to the Ideal-Rank Support Recovery problem, so that:
• In a final game G 3 we replace C = M ⊕ Rand by just C = Rand, which leads to the conclusion.
CCA-2 Security Proof:
When applying the HHK [33] framework for the Fujisaki-Okamoto transformation, one can show that the final transformation is CCA-2 secure such that:
where q G is the number of queries to the random oracle G and q V is the number of verification queries. As our scheme is CPA secure, the last term is negligible, we can handle exponentially large message space for a polynomial number of queries, so the previous is too.
As shown before, our scheme is gamma-spread so again for a polynomial number of verification queries, the term in q V is negligible.
The tricky term remaining is q G ·δ, this is the product of the number of queries to the random oracle, by the probability of generating an decipherable ciphertext in an honest execution. For real applications, we want schemes to be correct enough so that the probability of such an occurrence is very small. This often leads, in application in running with a probability of a magnitude of 2 −64 . This may seem not low enough for pure cryptographic security, however it should be noted that this number corresponds to the number of requests adversarially generated where the simulator gives an honest answer to a decryption query, which would mean that a single user would be able to do as many queries as expected by the whole targeted users in a live application, so a little trade-off at this level seems more than fair.
D. Best Known Attacks on RSD
The complexity of practical attacks grows very fast with the size of parameters, there is a structural reason for this: for Hamming distance a key notion for the attacks consists of counting the number of words of length n and support size t, which corresponds to the Newton binomial coefficient n t , whose value is exponential and upper bounded by 2 n . In the rank metric case, counting the number of possible supports of size r for a rank code of length n over F q m corresponds to counting the number of subspaces of dimension r in F q m : the Gaussian binomial coefficient of size roughly q rm , whose value is also exponential but with a quadratic term in the exponent.
There exist two types of generic attacks on the problem: -combinatorial attacks: these attacks are usually the best ones for small values of q (typically q = 2) and when n and k are not too small, when q increases, the combinatorial aspect makes them less efficient.
The first non-trivial attack on the problem was proposed by Chabaud and Stern [34] − k) 3 m 3 q (w−1)(k+1) . However, these two attacks did not take account of the value of m in the exponent. Very recently the two previous attacks were generalized in [36] (and used to break some repairs of the GPT cryposystems) moreover an algebraic new setting was also proposed, which gives an attack in O w 3 k 3 q
Finally, a last improvement of the combinatorial attack of [36] was proposed this year in [30] , for a complexity of
Remark VI.5. Since the linear system is not random, it is reasonable to take ω = 2 for the choice of the parameters of ROLLO-I, ROLLO-II and ROLLO-III, even if the attack described in [37] takes ω = 3. Let us remark that the choice of our parameter is flexible. We could take ω = 0 and increase the parameters, which corresponds to only keeping the exponential complexity of the attack, for instance by slightly increasing m.
-algebraic attacks: the particular nature of the rank metric makes it a natural field for algebraic attacks and solving by Groebner basis, since these attacks are largely independent of the value of q and in some cases may also be largely independent of m. These attacks are usually the most efficient ones when q increases. There exist different types of algebraic equations settings to try to solve a multivariate system with Groebner basis. The algebraic context proposed by Levy and Perret [31] in 2006 considers a quadratic setting over F q by taking as unknowns the support E of the error and the error coordinates regarding E. It is also possible to consider the Kernel attack by [38] and the minor approach [39] which give multivariate equations of degree r + 1 over F q obtained from minors of matrices Finally, the recent annulator setting by Gaborit et al. in [36] (which is valid on certain type of parameters but may not be independent on m) give multivariate sparse equations of degree q r+1 but on the large field F q m rather than on the base field F q . The latter attack is based on the notion of q-polynomial [24] and is particularly efficient when r is small. Moreover, all these attacks can be declined in an hybrid approach where some unknowns are guessed. In practice (and for the case of this paper) for the known state of the art these attacks seem less efficient than combinatorial attacks. Moreover, with today's knowledge, these attacks cannot benefit from a quantum speed up, hence even if such attacks do a little better for classical security than 256 bits, it won't necessarily imply a difference for a quantum security of 128 bits.
1) Impact of Quantum Algorithms on the Complexity of the Attacks:
In post-quantum cryptography, it is important to study the impact of quantum computer on the security of the schemes. In rank metric cryptography, the problems on which we are based are still difficult for a quantum computer, however there is a quantum speedup based on a generalization of Grover's quantum search algorithm for combinatorial attacks: the exponent of the complexity is divided by 2 [40] , which lead to a complexity of Concerning the algebraic attacks, there is currently no quantum speedup as far as we know.
E. Parameters
In this section, we give some sets of parameters for a quantum security parameters level of 64, 96 and 128, corresponding to classical level of security with respect to combinatorial attack of 128, 192 and 256. In all cases, we have chosen q = 2. The choice of these parameters depends on the probability of decryption failure and the complexity of the attacks against our cryptosystem: 1) Message attacks: they consist in solving an instance of the I − RSR problem of weight r II.11. 2) Attacks on the secret key: they consist to recover the structure of the Ideal-LRPC code by computing a codeword of weight d in the dual code VI.1. 3) Spurious key attack: as in the NTRU case (see [10] ) this attack corresponds to finding small word vectors in H with rank slightly greater than d, and to use them for decoding. Although theoretically possible, this attack is not doable in practice since the fact that H contains small weight vectors implies that many words of weight 2d exist. We do not go into details in this article but as for MDPC codes [20] , when the weight increases the complexity of the attacks grows faster than the number of small weight vectors, so that this attacks -as for NTRU and MDPC-does not work in practice.
The different parameters are:
• n is the length the vectors h and c sent on the public channel.
• m is the degree of the extension F 2 m .
• d is the weight of the ideal LRPC code used in the protocol.
• r is the weight of the error.
• P is the irreducible polynomial of degree n of
which defines the ideal LRPC code. We have chosen sparse polynomials in order to diminish the computation costs.
• the structural attack parameter is the complexity of the best attack to recover the structure of the ideal LRPC code. It consists in looking for a codeword of weight d in an ideal LRPC of type [2n, n] 2 m defined by the parity-check matrix (I n |H) where
Because of the structure of the ideal LRPC, the complexity of looking for a codeword of weight d is easier than in a random code (see [41] where ω = log 2 7 ≈ 2.8 is the cost of linear algebra.
• p f is the probability of failure of the decoding algorithm.
We have chosen the parameters such that the theoretic upper bound is below 2 −26 for the KEM. For the PKE, it is necessary to have a lower probability of failure since the public key can be used to encrypt a high number of messages. We give two sets of parameters: the first one for a probability below 2 −64 and the second one for a probability below 2 −80 .
• the entropy parameter is the entropy of the subspace E.
It is equal to log 2 m r q and has to be greater than the security parameter. We represent E by a matrix of size r × m in its row echelon form.
• the public key size is the number of bits needed to represent the public key h ∈ F n q m . It is equal to mn. Comparison With Other Cryptosystems: In terms of size of public key, the system compares very well with other proposal to the NIST competition. For 128 bits security key exchange (in which case one is allowed to a not too small decryption failure rate) the BIKE proposal (MDPC cryptosystem) has a public key of 10 kilo bits, hence the LRPC cryptosystem has public keys roughly three times smaller. In terms of encryption (with very small or null decryption failure rate), the system is comparable to the RQC cryptosystem, and far smaller than the McEliece cryptosystem. Globally among all candidates to the NIST competition, the LRPC cryptosystem has the second smaller size of public keys for 128 bits security, better than candidates based on lattices, but a little larger than systems based on isogenies. Moreover the system is also efficient in terms of speed compared to the other NIST proposals.
We also provide concrete timings of our implementations (given tables IV and V for the KEM and tables VI and VII for the PKE). The benchmarks were performed on an Intel®Core™i7-4700HQ CPU running @ up to 3.40GHz and the software was compiled using GCC (version 6.3.0) with the following command: g++ -O2 -pedantic -Wall -Wextra -Wno-vla.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, as in the recent MDPC paper [20] , we generalize the NTRU [10] approach in a coding context but with the rank metric. To do so we have introduced a new family of codes, LRPC codes, for which we propose an efficient decoding algorithm and we have carefully analyzed its failure probability. In order to reduce the public key size, we have chosen to use the special family of Ideal-LRPC codes.
Overall, as it is often the case for rank metric codes, the obtained results compare well to Hamming distance cryptosystems since the difficulty of known attacks increases. Moreover, while rank metric cryptosystems have a strong history of broken schemes because of structural attacks based on recovering the Gabidulin code structure, the cryptosystems we propose are the first rank-metric based cryptosystems that is not based on based on Gabidulin codes but on codes with a weak structure and a strong random component.
APPENDIX PROOF OF PROPOSITION V.10
We recall the propositionV.10: 
For the second point, we need to define the projection over the quotient vector space F q m /E.
ϕ is a linear map of F q vector spaces. For all U ⊂ F q m , U ⊂ E ⇐⇒ ϕ(U ) = {0}. Moreover we have the equality dim ϕ(U ) = dim U − dim(E ∩ U ). Therefore,
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